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A central goal in information theory and cryptography is finding simple characterizations of
optimal communication rates subject to various restrictions and security requirements. Ideally, the
optimal key rate for a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol would be given by single-letter
formula involving a simple optimization over a single use of an effective channel. We explore the
possibility of such a formula for one of the simplest and most widely used QKD protocols—Bennett-
Brassard-84 (BB84) with one way classical post-processing. We show that a conjectured single-letter
key-rate formula is false, uncovering a deep ignorance about asymptotically good private codes and
pointing towards unfortunate complications in the theory of QKD. These complications are not
without benefit—with added complexity comes better key rates than previously thought possible.
We improve the threshold for secure key generation from a bit error rate of 0.124 to 0.129.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
using public channels to remotely establish a secret key
whose security is not predicated on the difficulty of some
computational task. Rather, the security of the key gen-
erated by a QKD protocol depends only on fundamental
laws of physics. As a result there has been an enormous
amount of work on practical and theoretical aspects of
QKD, and a corresponding rapid progress in both [1].
The first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 [2], and like all QKD schemes, it is based
on the tradeoff between information gain and disturbance
in quantum mechanics. To establish a bit of raw key, the
sender (Alice) encodes a random bit into one of two con-
jugate bases (X or Z), chosen at random, and transmits
it to a receiver (Bob). Bob measures in either the X or
Z basis, also chosen at random. After generating a large
number of bits(say, 2n), Alice and Bob can sift out the
bits for which they both chose the same basis by public
discussion, leaving roughly n bits.
Alice then randomly permutes her remaining bits and
announces the permutation to Bob, after which they per-
form parameter estimation by comparing a small fraction
of their bits to find the error rate of the sifted key. If the
fraction p of bits on which they disagree is sufficiently
small, they proceed with information reconciliation and
privacy amplification to finally arrive at a secret key. The
essence of the protocol is that if an eavesdropper Eve,
who is assumed to have control of the quantum channel,
examines the signals in order to determine the key, she
will necessarily cause some disturbance which manifests
itself as errors in the sifted key. Thus p also characterizes
how much Eve could have learned about the key.
An important property of any QKD protocol is the
amount of noise that can be tolerated without compro-
mising the privacy of the resulting key, the amount of
noise at which the protocol aborts. The entanglement-
based security proof of Shor and Preskill [3] showed that
BB84 can be used to generate private key for detected
bit error rates as high as p ≈ 0.11, basically by showing
there exist Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) [4, 5] codes
correcting noise up to this level. Remarkably, it was re-
cently found [6, 7] that this can be improved to p ≈ 0.124
if Alice adds independent noise to her sifted key before
performing the distillation steps, which has been conjec-
tured to be optimal among all one-way key distillation
protocols [7]. The key rates of [6] come from evaluat-
ing a single-letter key rate for an effective state found by
Devetak and Winter in [8], and indeed the 0.124 thresh-
old of [6, 7] is the optimal threshold for this single-letter
formula [21]. If these rates were optimal among all proto-
cols, it would indicate a single-letter formula for one-way
QKD key-rates, providing a dramatic simplification in
the theory of quantum key distribution protocols.
We will show that p ≈ 0.124 is not optimal, and the
threshold is at least p ≈ 0.129. We increase the threshold
by finding improved error correcting codes for the infor-
mation reconciliation phase. The technique is analogous
to those of [9, 10, 11], which use degenerate CSS codes
to achieve higher quantum capacities than are achievable
by the single-letter formula for quantum capacity arising
from random stabilizer codes. Though the true maxi-
mization needed for the multi-letter capacity formula in
[8] remains out of reach, we are able to evaluate rates for
particular multi-letter inputs which achieve higher key
rates than the single-letter maximum. While this is sug-
gestive, we emphasize that our results to not necessarily
rule out a single-letter formula for the one-way key-rate.
We have shown that the single-letter Devetak-Winter for-
mula does not give the one-way distillable key, but this
does not preclude the existence of some other single-letter
optimization problem that gives the optimal key rate.
Taken together, our information reconciliation and pri-
vacy amplification steps can be described by a highly
degenerate CSS code. A quantum code is called degener-
ate if its syndrome does not uniquely identify the errors
which it corrects. This is a uniquely quantum effect—
2there is no such thing as a degenerate classical code–and
all such codes involve entanglement. It appears remark-
able then that degeneracy should help in the classical
processing task of key distillation. Moreover, Alice and
Bob need not perform any multi-particle quantum oper-
ations even in our improved protocol. The resolution is
that Eve’s best attacks involve entanglement, and degen-
eracy will make this work against her.
Degenerate codes have been used for QKD before;
specifically, to improve the threshold of the six-state pro-
tocol from 0.126 to 0.127 [12]. However, this protocol did
not involve noisy processing, and in fact a better thresh-
old was obtained for the six-state protocol by [6, 7]. Our
result combines degenerate codes with noisy processing,
leading to an advantage over either one alone.
Analytic key rate expression—To determine the secret
key rate of the modified protocol, we follow [6, 7, 13].
First, the prepare & measure protocol can be converted
to an equivalent scheme in which Alice prepares the
maximally-entangled state |Φ+〉⊗mnAB and sends half to
Bob. Each party then randomly and independently mea-
sures either X or Z on each signal, saving the outcomes
for use in parameter estimation and key generation. They
discard the outcomes where their basis choice did not
agree, and denoting the remaining outcomes KA and KB
it follows from Corollary 6.5.2 of [13] that for any m-bit
processing step KmA → U and U → V it is possible to
use standard (i.e., unstructured, random) error correc-
tion and privacy amplification to distill secret key at rate
r =
1
m
inf
σAB∈Γp
[
S(U |V Em)− S(U |V KmB )
]
, (1)
evaluated on the state generated by performing the pro-
cessing on σ⊗mAB , and where Γp is the set of single pair
Bell-diagonal states σAB passing the parameter estima-
tion phase of the protocol and Em is the purification
of σ⊗mAB , which we must assume belongs to Eve. S(ρ) =
−Tr ρ log ρ is the von Neumann entropy. This expression
is similar to what was found in [6, 7], with the additional
feature that it includes blockwise processing. Since the
X and Z bases are randomly used to create the sifted key,
the error estimation provides an estimate of the bit- and
phase-flip noise rates, so that the allowable σAB are of
the form σAB = (1+ t−2p)|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+(p− t)(|Φ−〉〈Φ−|+
|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|) + t|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| for t ∈ [0, p].
Below, we choose a particularKmA → U → V for which
Eq. (1) outperforms all previously known protocols for
large p. The measurements leading to KA and KB will
be the same as for the usual BB84 protocol, with the
processing step chosen as follows. For each m bit block
of KA, (x1, x2, . . . , xm), Alice independently flips each
bit with probability q, resulting in x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜m). She
then computes U = (x˜1, x˜1 ⊕ x˜2, . . . , x˜1 ⊕ x˜m) and sends
V = (x˜1 ⊕ x˜2, . . . , x˜1 ⊕ x˜m) to Bob, after which they do
error correction and privacy amplification as usual. The
key rate they achieve is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The key rate achieved using the processing
x → U → V with U = (x˜1, x˜1 ⊕ x˜2, . . . , x˜1 ⊕ x˜m), V =
(x˜1⊕x˜2, . . . , x˜1⊕x˜m), where x˜ = x⊕f and f is a string of
independent 0-1 random variables, each with probability
q of being 1, is given by
r =
1
m
(
1−
∑
s
P p˜m(s)H
(
P p˜m(u|s)
)
+mS(ρp,q)
− S
(
1
2
ρ⊗mp,q +
1
2
Z⊗mρ⊗mp,q Z
⊗m
))
. (2)
Here ρp,q = (1 − q)|ϕ+〉〈ϕ+| + q|ϕ−〉〈ϕ−| with |ϕ±〉 =√
1− p|0〉±√p|1〉, p˜ = p(1−q)+q(1−p), while P p˜m(u, s)
is defined in Lemma 2. The entropy H of a classical prob-
ability distribution P is given by H(P ) = −∑l Pl logPl.
We proceed by noting that in the entanglement picture,
our processing step is equivalent to Alice first adding in-
dependent bit errors to her halves of the noisy EPR pairs,
measuring the stabilizers of an m qubit repetition code,
and then sending her syndrome outcomes to Bob. We
apply the following lemma, which follows from [11].
Lemma 2 The m qubit repetition code with stabilizers
Z1Z2, . . . , Z1Zm maps the error X
uZv to the logical error
Xu1Z⊕
m
l=1vl and syndrome s = (u1 ⊕ u2, . . . u1 ⊕ um).
When used to correct independent bit errors of probability
p, the probability of a logical bit error u and syndrome s
is given by
P pm(u, s) =
(
pm−s(1− p)s)u (ps(1− p)m−s)1−u , (3)
for s = |s|.
Proof of Theorem 1 To evaluate Eq. (1), first let
σ⊗mAB =
∑
u,v
puvX
u
BZ
v
B
[|Φ+〉〈Φ+|]⊗m
AB
ZvBX
u
B, (4)
with puv such that pu =
∑
v
puv = p
|u|(1 − p)m−|u|, for
measured bit error rate p, and similarly for pv.
Alice adds independent noise at error rate q to the A
register, so the state of the Alice-Bob-Eve system can be
described as∑
u,v,f
√
puvqf |f〉A′XuBZvBX fB|Φ+〉⊗mAB |u〉E1 |v〉E2 , (5)
where we have used the fact that XA ⊗ I|Φ+〉AB = I ⊗
XB|Φ+〉AB. Note that Eve’s system is determined by the
fact that in the worst case she holds the purification of
the state after it emerges from the channel. However, she
does not hold the purification of the noise Alice adds.
Alice and Bob then measure the stabilizers of the m-
qubit repetition code (Z1Z2, . . . Z1Zm) and Alice sends
her outcomes to Bob. This is equivalent to having Bob
defers his measurement until he receives Alice’s message
3and then coherently correcting his key bit, which we will
consider here. Renaming Bob’s m − 1 syndrome qubits
system B′, the state they’ll share in this case is
∑
u,v,f
√
puvqf |f〉A′Xu1⊕f1B Z⊕
m
l=1vl
B |Φ+〉AB (6)
⊗|su,f 〉B′ |u〉E1ZfE2 |v〉E2 ,
where su,f is an (m−1)-bit string labeling the basis states
of B′ whose jth bit is (su,f )j = u1 ⊕ uj+1 ⊕ f1 ⊕ fj+1.
Note that the Zf acting on Eve’s second system comes
from the commutation of ZvB and X
f
B.
Getting rid of the A′ system (but keeping it from Eve),
we now let Alice and Bob measure systems A and BB′
in the computational basis, respectively. According to
Eq. (1), the difference of conditional entropies for the
resulting state will give us the key rate. This will be
simpler to analyze by first rewriting the lower bound as
r ≥ 1
m
inf
σAB∈Γp
I(A;BB′)− I(A;E). (7)
I(A;BB′) is the mutual information (I(X ;Y ) = S(X)+
S(Y )−S(XY )) of ρABB′ = 12
∑1
x=0 |x〉〈x|A⊗ρxB′B, where
ρxB′B =
∑
f
∑
u
qfpu |x+f1+u1〉〈x+f1+u1|B ⊗ |su,f 〉〈su,f |
=
∑
s
P p˜m(s)
1∑
u=0
P p˜m(u|s)|x+u〉〈x+u|B ⊗ |s〉〈s|B′ ,
and the P p˜m(u, s) are given by Lemma 2. Thus,
the mutual information, I(A;BB′), is exactly 1 −∑
s
P p˜m(s)H(P
p˜
m(u|s)). Notice that this term only de-
pends on pu, which is determined by the parameter esti-
mation phase, so it will be the same for all σAB ∈ Γp.
Turning to the second term in Eq. (7), we want to
find the mutual information of the Alice-Eve system,
ρAE1E2 =
1
2
∑1
x=0 |x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρxE1E2 , where
ρxE1E2 =
(
Z⊗mE2
)x ∑
u,v1,v2,f
qf
√
pu|v1pu|v2 |u〉〈u|E1 ⊗
√
pv1pv2 Z
f |v1〉〈v2|E2Zf

(Z⊗mE2 )x . (8)
Note that the (Z⊗mE2 )
x comes from the action of Z⊕
m
l=1vl
on B. When bit and phase errors are independent,
this expression can be further simplified. Defining µ =∑
u
pu|u〉〈u| and ρp,q = (1−q)|ϕ+〉〈ϕ+|+q|ϕ−〉〈ϕ−| with
|ϕ±〉 =
√
1−p|0〉±√p|1〉, we can write
ρxE1,E2 = µE1 ⊗
(
Z⊗mE2
)x [
ρ⊗mp,q
]
E2
(
Z⊗mE2
)x
. (9)
Actually, we have to maximize I(A;E1E2) over all puv
corresponding to states in σAB ∈ Γp, but the largest
value is attained for independent phase and bit errors.
This means that Eve’s optimal attack on the protocol
will be to choose σAB ∈ Γp with t = p2. In particular,
if Eve starts with the independent u,v state, by tracing
out the E1 system and using the isometry
U =
∑
v,u
√
pu|v|u〉E3 |v〉E2〈v|E2 , (10)
then completely dephasing E3, she can construct a
ρAE2E3 with the same mutual information as if the errors
were distributed according to pu|vpv. Since mutual infor-
mation cannot be increased by local operations, the in-
dependent noise state must have the largest value. More-
over, as the E1 system is uncorrelated with AE2, I(A;E)
can be easily computed, yielding
I(A;E) = S
(
1
2
ρ⊗mp,q +
1
2
Z⊗mρ⊗mp,q Z
⊗m
)
−mS(ρp,q).
Taking the difference between I(A;BB′) and I(A;E),
keeping in mind we must sendm qubits for eachm-block,
leads to the overall key rate of Eq. (2). ⊓⊔
Numerical key rates—We now evaluate Eq. (2) for par-
ticular p, q, and m. S(ρp,q) is easily calculated and the
second term can be evaluated efficiently via Eq. (3). The
most difficult term is S
(
1
2
ρ⊗mp,q +
1
2
Z⊗mρ⊗mp,q Z
⊗m
)
, but it
can be handled as follows. Due to the permutation-
invariance of the state ρ⊗mp,q , it is compactly expressed as
a direct sum over the SU(2) irreducible representations
(irreps). Each irrep occurs with some degeneracy, giv-
ing a permutation factor, which by Schur’s lemma [14]
is maximally-mixed. Using the expression for multiple
copies of a qubit mixed state from [15], which gives the
irreducible states of ρ⊗mp,q as a function of its Bloch vector
and doing the same for Z⊗mρ⊗mp,q Z
⊗m, we can compute
S
(
1
2
ρ⊗mp,q +
1
2
Z⊗mρ⊗mp,q Z
⊗m
)
for m up to several hundred.
In general, larger m gives higher thresholds with the
optimal q ≈ 0.3 increasing slowly with m (FIG 1).
m=400 and q=0.32 give nonzero key rate up to p=.1292,
but for larger m the computation becomes quite slow.
Discussion—Given the pattern of improving thresh-
olds with largerm, it is tempting to guess the best thresh-
old within our family of codes will be when m → ∞ as
q → 0.5. While we have not been able to do so, we hope
that an asymptotic analysis of our key rates in the limit of
large m could be tractable. Along these lines, note that
40 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.50.116
0.118
0.12
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FIG. 1: Bit error rate p at which the key rate goes to zero
as a function of processing noise q when using various-sized
repetition codes in the BB84 protocol. The curves are, from
bottom to top, m = 1,m = 10, 20, . . . 100, illustrating the fact
that a longer repetition code allows a higher threshold. As m
is increased, the optimal q also grows. Taking m = 400 and
q = 0.32 gives our best threshold of 0.1292.
an exact analysis of large repetition codes in the context
of quantum capacities was successfully carried out in [9].
We note that our codes are highly restricted, and it is
not at all clear that they should be optimal. One idea for
better rates is to adapt the concatenation of repetition
codes in conjugate bases used in [10, 11] to key genera-
tion, using a repetition code in the X basis to improve
privacy amplification. A more ambitious approach is to
develop new degenerate codes for this problem, perhaps
using the heuristic suggested in [11].
The best upper bound on the BB84 key rate is
H(1/2−2p(1−p))−H(2p(1−p)) [16]. This gives an upper
bound on the threshold for BB84 of p = (1−1/√2)/2 ≈
0.1464, matching the bound due to the optimal individ-
ual attack found in [17]. There remains a significant gap
between our lower bound of 0.129 and this upper bound.
Our one-way protocols bear a striking resemblance to
two-way protocols using advantage distillation [18]. In
particular, an advantage distillation protocol can be de-
scribed as using a repetition code, with Bob sending the
syndromes back to Alice. Error correction and privacy
amplification are performed on blocks for which no er-
ror is detected, while the blocks for which an error is
detected are thrown away. Without back communication
from Bob, Alice would not know the syndromes, and thus
be unable to discard blocks in which Bob had detected an
error. Our findings show that even in this case, with Al-
ice ignorant of the syndromes, and thus unable to discard
bad blocks, there is still a benefit in using a repetition
code. The repetition code works “better than expected”,
because it collapses many phase errors to a single logical
phase error, while still providing information about bit
errors. This benefit should also appear when the code is
used for advantage distillation with noisy processing.
One-way protocols with noisy processing can be viewed
quite naturally as distillation protocols for twisted EPR
pairs [19, 20]. In [19] it was shown that noisy processing
can be interpreted as the deflection of Eve’s correlations
away from the sifted key into a “shield” system, which
purifies the noise added by Alice. Viewed in this way,
the benefit of a repetition code is that it allows us to
combine the “soft” approach of deflecting phase errors
and the “hard” approach of correcting bit errors – while
learning about bit errors that we must correct, we are
simultaneously decreasing Eve’s correlation with the key,
reducing the need for privacy amplification later.
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